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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 18-1215
____________
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE;
NEW JERSEY DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE;
VIRGINIA L. FEGGINS;
LYNETTE MONROE
v.
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE;
NEW JERSEY REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE;
ALEX HURTADO;
RONALD C. KAUFMAN;
JOHN KELLY
Democratic National Committee,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. No. 2-81-cv-03876)
District Judge: Hon. John M. Vazquez
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 2, 2018
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 7, 2019)

____________
OPINION*
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
The Democratic National Committee and Republican National Committee entered
into a Consent Decree on November 1, 1982 to resolve a 1981 lawsuit. Less than two
weeks prior to the 2016 presidential election, the DNC filed a motion to hold the RNC in
contempt for an alleged violation of the Decree. After fifteen months of discovery, the
District Court determined that the DNC had not shown a violation of the Consent Decree.
The DNC appeals several discovery orders and the order declaring the Decree expired.
We will affirm.
I.
A. The Consent Decree
Following the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, the DNC sued the RNC
and the New Jersey Republican State Committee (NJRSC) for intimidation of minority
voters. The suit was resolved by a settlement that included the Consent Decree at the
center of this case.1 This Court has acknowledged that the prevention of intimidation and

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
App. 514 (Consent Order, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm.,
No. 81-3876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982)).
1
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suppression of minority voters is the “central purpose” of the Consent Decree and its later
modifications.2
The Consent Decree prevents the RNC and NJRSC from engaging in “ballot
security” programs, defined as “any program aimed at combatting voter fraud by
preventing potential voters from registering to vote or casting a ballot.”3 It does not ban
“normal poll watching functions.”4 The Decree was modified in 2009 to state that it
would expire on December 1, 2017, unless the DNC proved a violation of the Decree. If
the DNC proved a violation, the Decree would be extended eight years.
B. The Trump Campaign and Alleged RNC Coordination
Less than two weeks before the 2016 presidential election, the DNC filed an
emergency motion to hold the RNC in contempt, alleging that the RNC was violating the
Decree by coordinating ballot security efforts with the campaign of then-candidate
Donald Trump. The motion requested that the District Court issue a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the RNC from participating in or encouraging ballot security
activities.

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 203 (3d Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1138 (2013).
3
App. 18 (D. Ct. Op.).
4
App. 17-18.
2
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The DNC alleged that the RNC actively supported voter suppression tactics
endorsed by the Trump campaign.5 Then-RNC Chair Reince Priebus made statements
that the RNC was in “full coordination” with the Trump campaign in the weeks and
months leading up to the election.6 The DNC alleged that the RNC’s coordination with
the campaign included efforts to intimidate and suppress minority voters. In response, the
RNC repeatedly asserted it did not engage in any poll watching activities, even activities
that would be permitted by the Decree. The DNC concedes that RNC lawyers informed
RNC staff that the RNC could not engage in ballot security activities.
The DNC made a discovery request the day after it filed its initial motion. The
District Court issued two discovery orders in quick succession, ordering the RNC to
produce agreements between it and the Trump campaign related to voter fraud, ballot
security, and RNC poll-watching. Three days before the election, the District Court
denied the DNC’s requested preliminary injunction but permitted discovery to continue.
Discovery continued until January 2018, when the District Court determined that
the DNC had not shown a violation of the Consent Decree by a preponderance of the

At rallies, Trump made statements such as: “[G]o around and watch other polling
places,” App. 536; “[It’s] so important that you watch other communities, because we
don’t want this election stolen from us,” App. 538; and “You’ve got to get everybody to
go out and watch . . . . And when I say ‘watch,’ you know what I’m talking about.
Right?” App. 546. The Trump campaign website contained a form allowing supporters to
register as “Trump Election Observers.” App. 548.
6
App. 599.
5
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evidence. The court issued orders denying a final discovery request and declaring the
Consent Decree expired. The DNC appeals.
II.
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the original suit.7 It
retained jurisdiction to review and enforce the Consent Decree.8 This Court has appellate
jurisdiction over an appeal from the Consent Decree by its terms.9 “We review a district
court’s discovery orders for abuse of discretion, and will not disturb such an order absent
a showing of actual and substantial prejudice.”10 We review a district court’s decisions on
whether to modify or vacate a consent decree for abuse of discretion.11

7

28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 440 (2004) (“Federal courts are not reduced to
approving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, a consent decree
may be enforced.”).
9
The Decree contained an explicit reservation of appellate jurisdiction over the
enforcement of the settlement terms, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Keefe v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Halderman v.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that courts have
jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements incorporated into orders).
10
Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010).
11
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 201 (citing Del. Valley Citizens’ Counsel
for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 755 F.2d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 1985)).
8

5

III.
The DNC argues that the District Court abused its discretion in entering eight
orders limiting discovery12 and one order declaring the Decree expired.13 However,
looking at the scope of discovery in its totality and at the individual orders that the DNC
challenges, it is clear that the court acted within its broad discretion.
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the general scope
for discovery. However, that scope is prefaced by language giving district courts
discretion to limit discovery: “Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is . . . .”14 The court may limit discovery to ensure its scope is proportional to
the needs of a case, and the court considers, among other factors, “whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”15 Whether a court
reasonably limited the scope of discovery is necessarily a fact-based inquiry.
Because district courts have their eyes and ears on a case from start to finish, they
are in the best position to “reach[] a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope
of discovery.”16 For that reason, we choose not to second-guess discovery orders except

12

The DNC challenges discovery orders dated October 31, 2016 (Dkt. No. 113);
November 2, 2016 (Dkt. No. 118); November 5, 2016 (Dkt. Nos. 139); January 4, 2017
(Dkt. No. 146); July 7, 2017 (Dkt. No. 167); September 29, 2017 (Dkt. No. 182);
November 29, 2017 (Dkt. No. 197); and January 8, 2018 (Dkt. No. 212).
13
Order dated January 8, 2018 (Dkt. No. 213).
14
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
15
Id.
16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
6

where the court has abused its discretion.17 “To demonstrate that a district court abused
its discretion, an appellant must show that the court’s decision was ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or
clearly unreasonable.’”18
The District Court reasonably limited the scope of the DNC’s individual discovery
requests. The DNC isolates instances where discovery was denied as evidence of an
abuse of discretion. For example, it highlights the court’s refusal of its request to depose
Reince Preibus. But in denying that request, the court concluded that Preibus’s statements
about knowing the Trump campaign’s position on voter fraud did not suggest any
discussions of ballot security efforts. After the court allowed the DNC to depose thenRNC Communications Director Sean Spicer, the DNC requested to depose Mike Roman,
the alleged “front man for the Trump Campaign’s efforts against voter fraud.”19 In
denying that request, the court determined that there was no evidence from Spicer’s
deposition or at any point on the record that the RNC was working with Roman.

17

The DNC relies upon an inapposite case from the Ninth Circuit to try to soften
the standard. Appellant’s Br. 29-31 (citing Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d
1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Leavitt court exercised de novo review rather than
reviewing for an abuse of discretion because “the district court only implicitly denied the
request to authorize discovery” and therefore failed to exercise its discretion at all.
Leavitt, 523 F.3d at 1031-32. This case involves thorough, explicit rulings on discovery
disputes by the District Court, so Leavitt’s reasoning is not applicable.
18
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 201 (quoting Moyer v. United Dominion
Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007)).
19
App. 479.
7

The DNC also points to its denied request to depose Pennsylvania State
Republican Party officials Tommy Knepper and Rob Gleason. However, the court
correctly noted that the emails in support of the request regarding Tommy Knepper were
related to voter turnout rather than ballot security activities, and Rob Gleason submitted a
declaration that he was acting in his capacity as Chair of the Pennsylvania State
Republican Party, not as a member of the RNC.20
The DNC additionally asserts that the District Court erred in not allowing them to
depose Nevada poll watchers and a representative from Stampede. The District Court had
good reason for not permitting the depositions. The District Court was provided with a
declaration that stated that the RNC had no poll-watching operation in Nevada, and
discovery revealed that Stampede was performing permissible, non-ballot security work
in Florida and no services for the RNC in Nevada. The District Court also had evaluated
information presented to it concerning the DNC's need for a document demand for
communications between the RNC and JTD Strategies and determined the information
was insufficient to require production of the information the demand sought. The DNC

20

The District Court stated that to hold Rob Gleason accountable to the Decree
would require the conclusion that all fifty state party chairs are subject to the Decree.
App. 38-39. The court noted that there is no support for that broad a reading in the
Decree or opinions interpreting it; rather, Judge Debevoise, the presiding judge for
previous Decree disputes, expressly rejected that interpretation. Accordingly, Gleason’s
alleged actions were and are irrelevant and thus did not warrant a deposition.
8

did not raise a single challenge that was not carefully and appropriately considered by the
District Court.
The District Court’s handling of discovery on the whole suggests anything but
“arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable” decision making. In total, the court reviewed
more than thirty filings in fifteen months. It heard on-the-record argument in nine
separate instances, issuing nine written orders in response. The court afforded the parties
the opportunity to be heard, thoughtfully considered their arguments, and provided
detailed explanations of its decisions. Those decisions were couched within the burden
versus benefit framework of Rule 26(b)(1). Further, the court required the RNC to review
tens of thousands of pages of its own records, which resulted in the production of
thousands of pages to the DNC. The court neither abused its discretion in its handling of
discovery as a whole, nor abused its discretion with regard to any individual discovery
request.
The DNC fails to support its challenge of the District Court's order declaring the
Decree expired by its terms with any argument that the court abused its discretion. The
DNC hangs its hat on its challenges to the discovery orders, arguing that if we find that
the court abused its discretion on discovery, then we should also find that the Decree
could not be ordered expired. However, because the District Court did not abuse its
discretion on discovery, it follows that it did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
Decree had expired.

9

While it is possible that another court would have allowed further discovery or
managed the case differently, we review only for abuse of discretion. The District Court
did not abuse its discretion, and we will not upset its thoughtful adjudication of the
matter.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm.
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